Posted by Pamela Griffin Delafield on October 30, 1998 at 21:56:30:
I found this Supreme Court decision. It looks like any
individual (or company) who acts on a law that is later
declared illegal, is held responsible for civil rights violations.
This would have to hold true for a state agency giving a carrier an order that is later declared illegal. The carrier violated civil rights of due process and equal protection and violated the 14th amendment. The carriers not paying interest when it is in Statute even if WC doesn't understand the Statute, the carrier is still in violation. I am sending this to TWCC and the AG's office. It should blow some skirts up.
U.S. Supreme Court
WYATT v. COLE, 504 U.S. 158 (1992)
504 U.S. 158
HOWARD WYATT, PETITIONER v. BILL COLE AND JOHN
ROBBINS, II CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Argued January 14, 1992
Decided May 18, 1992
With the assistance of respondent Robbins, an attorney,
respondent Cole filed a complaint under the Mississippi
replevin statute against his partner, petitioner Wyatt. After Cole refused to comply with a state court order to return to Wyatt property seized under the statute, Wyatt brought suit in the Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the state statute's constitutionality and seeking injunctive relief and damages.
Among other things, the court. held the statute
unconstitutional and assumed that Cole was subject to
liability under Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, in which this Court ruled that private defendants invoking state replevin, garnishment, and attachment statutes later declared unconstitutional act under color of state law for 1983 liability purposes. The court also intimated that, but did not decide whether, Robbins was subject to 1983 liability. However, Lugar had left open the question whether private defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity from suit in such
cases, see id., at 942, n. 23, and the District Court held that respondents were entitled to qualified immunity at least for conduct arising prior to the replevin statute's invalidation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of qualified immunity to respondents without revisiting the question of their 1983 liability.
1. Qualified immunity from suit, as enunciated by this Court with respect
to government officials, is not available to private defendants charged
with 1983 liability for invoking state replevin, garnishment, or attachment
statutes. Immunity for private defendants was not so firmly rooted in the
common law, and was not supported by such strong policy reasons as to create
an inference that Congress meant to incorporate it into 1983. See, e.g.,
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637. Even if there were sufficient
common law support to conclude that private defendants should be entitled
to a good faith and/or probable cause defense to suits for unjustified
harm arising out of the misuse of governmental processes, that would still
not entitle respondents to what they obtained in the courts below: the
type of objectively determined, immediately appealable, qualified immunity
from suit accorded government officials under, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
[504 U.S. 158, 159] 457 U.S. 800, and Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511.
Moreover, the policy concerns mandating qualified immunity for officials
in such cases - the need to preserve the officials' ability to perform
their discretionary functions and to ensure that talented candidates not
be deterred by the threat of damages suits from entering public service
- are not applicable to private
parties. Although it may be that private defendants faced with 1983 liability under Lugar, supra, could be entitled to an affirmative good faith defense, or that 1983 suits against private, rather than governmental, parties could require plaintiffs to carry additional burdens, those issues are neither before the Court nor decided here. Pp. 163-169.
2. On remand, it must be determined, at least, whether
respondents, in invoking the replevin statute, acted under color of state law within the meaning of Lugar, supra. P. 169. 928 F.2d 718, reversed and remanded.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN,
STEVENS, SCALIA, and KENNEDY,
JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined, post, p. 169. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER and THOMAS, JJ., joined, post, p. 175.
Jim Waide argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Douglas M. Magee and Alan B. Morrison.
Joseph Leray McNamara argued the cause and filed a brief fo
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